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Perhaps the simple rational expectations assumption is at fault here,
for it is diﬃcult to believe that economic agents in the hyperinﬂations
understood the dynamic processes in which they were participating
without undergoing some learning process that would be the equivalent
of adaptive expectations.
Stanley Fischer, 1987
The Larida proposal starts from the premise that indexation, not mone-
tized deﬁcits, is the cause of inﬂation, and I share that view completely.
Money creation, and more importantly, rising velocity because of mone-
tary deregulation, are at best the air in the tires; indexation is decidedly
the engine of inﬂation.
Rudiger Dornbusch, 1985
I. Introduction
I.1. A hidden Markov model. This paper estimates a hidden Markov model for in-
ﬂation in ﬁve South American countries, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.
1
Ours is a “back-to-basics” model. It features a demand function for money inspired
by Cagan (1956), a budget constraint that determines the rate at which a govern-
ment prints money, a stochastic money-ﬁnanced deﬁcit whose mean and volatility
are governed by a ﬁnite state Markov chain, and an adaptive scheme for the pub-
lic’s expected rate of inﬂation that allows occasional hard-to-detect deviations from
rational expectations that help to explain features of the data that a strict rational
expectations version of the model cannot. We trust our monthly series on inﬂation
but lack trustworthy monthly data on deﬁcits and money supplies. Therefore, to es-
timate the model’s free parameters, we form the density of a history of inﬂation, view
it as a likelihood, and maximize it with respect to the parameters. For each country,
we then form a joint density for the inﬂation and deﬁcit histories at the maximum
likelihood parameter estimates and use it to calculate a density for the deﬁcit history
conditional on the inﬂation history. As one of several validation exercises, we compare
this deﬁcit density with the annual monetary deﬁcit data that we do have. Unlike
purely statistical models, we can use our model to infer the causes of hyperinﬂations
1Elliott, Aggoun, and Moore (1995) is a good reference about hidden Markov models.








Figure 1. Mean adaptive dynamics and REE dynamics.
and stabilizations at diﬀerent times and places. Our model oﬀers explanations of
particular inﬂations and stabilizations that diﬀer substantially across episodes.
Our purpose in positing an adaptive expectations scheme is not to turn the clock
back to the days before the hallmark cross-equation restrictions of the rational ex-
pectations revolution caused expectations to disappear as free variables in dynamic
models.
2 On the contrary, we shall exploit rational expectations restrictions and self-
conﬁrming equilibria when we analyze salient features of our model’s dynamics that
allow it to ﬁt the inﬂation data. But like Marcet and Nicolini (2003), our model
retreats from rational expectations by adding an adaptation parameter that gives
people’s expectations dynamics that help our model explain the data, partly by elim-
inating some perverse out-of-steady state rational expectations dynamics and partly
by allowing occasional expectations-driven big inﬂations. Though we use diﬀerent
procedures to highlight this, we shall argue along with Marcet and Nicolini (2003)
that the departures of our model from rational expectations are not large.
I.2. Basic idea. We start with the insight of Marcet and Sargent (1989b) and Marcet and Nicolini
(2003) that an adaptive expectations version of a hyperinﬂation model shares steady
states with its rational expectations version, but has more plausible out-of-steady-
state dynamics. Figures 1 and 2 summarize the dynamics of the model of Sargent and Wallace
(1987) and Marcet and Sargent (1989b) and show the basic ingredients of our model.
2Sargent (1981) and most of the articles in Lucas and Sargent (1981) argue for making parameters
measuring expectations disappear from econometric models. Lucas (1986) and Marcet and Sargent
(1989a,b) used adaptive expectations schemes to justify rational expectations as an equilibrium
concept supported by a law of large numbers and to select among multiple rational expectations








Figure 2. Adaptive dynamics and the “escape event”.
Here ¯t denotes the public’s expected gross rate of inﬂation at date t; H(¯) and
G(¯) describe the actual inﬂation ¼t determined by rational expectations (or perfect
foresight) dynamics and some least squares learning (or adaptive expectations) dy-
namics, respectively. The dashed curves correspond to a higher deﬁcit level than do
the solid curves. Figure 1 indicates that while the rational expectations dynamics
and the learning dynamics share ﬁxed points (the zeros of H and G), they identify
diﬀerent ﬁxed points as stable ones: the high expected inﬂation ﬁxed point ¼¤
2 is
stable under the rational expectations dynamics, while the lower expected inﬂation
ﬁxed point ¼¤
1 is stable under the learning dynamics.3 The two ﬁxed points are on
diﬀerent sides of the peak of the Laﬀer curve, so increases in the deﬁcit raise ¼¤
1, but
lower ¼¤
2.4 Around the lower ﬁxed point, increases in the government deﬁcit increase
inﬂation, while they lower inﬂation at the higher ﬁxed point. An attractive feature
of the learning dynamics is that they dispose of the implausible higher ﬁxed point,
with its perverse comparative statics, as a focal point for analysis.
Now think of stochastic versions of a model under the learning dynamics in which
the G curve shifts in a stochastically stationary way as shocks impinge on the deﬁcit
or in which shocks impinge directly on the inﬂation rate without shifting the G curve.
In such a stochastic version of the model with learning, the learning dynamics will
tend to push expected inﬂation toward a stochastic counterpart of the lower ﬁxed
point so long as expectations remain within its domain of attraction, i.e., so long as
they remain beneath ¼¤
2. But occasionally shocks might push ¯t above ¼¤
2, the shaded
3Lucas (1986),Marcet and Sargent (1989a), and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) recommend se-
lecting rational expectations equilibria that are stable under least squares learning.
4See Marcet and Sargent (1989b) for details.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 4
region in ﬁgure 2 in which the G dynamics cause actual and expected inﬂation to
increase without limit. When ¯ exceeds ¼¤
2, we say that an escape (from the domain
of attraction of ¼¤
1) has occurred. Marcet and Nicolini (2003) exploit the insight that
occasional escapes from the domain of attraction of ¼¤
1 could capture the recurrent
bursts of inﬂation in Latin America that seemed not to coincide with any marked
increases in government deﬁcits. However, note that when deﬁcits are higher on
average, as in the dashed lines in ﬁgure 1, not only is inﬂation higher on average due
to the higher ¼¤
1, but the higher ﬁxed point ¼¤
2 is lower and thus it will be easier for
beliefs to escape. To make this explanation ﬁt together, Marcet and Nicolini (2003)
supplemented the basic model of Marcet and Sargent (1989b) with a story about
mechanical reforms that end an escape episode by exogenously interrupting the G
dynamics and resetting actual inﬂation (and therefore ¼t) well within the domain of
attraction of ¼¤
1 under the G dynamics.
We adopt the idea of Marcet and Nicolini (2003) that there are recurrent escapes,
but diﬀer from them in our stochastic speciﬁcation of the deﬁcit and the reform
event. Instead of calibrating the model as they do, we form a likelihood function,
maximize it, then use the equilibrium probability distribution that we estimate to
extract interpretations of the observed hyperinﬂation in terms of “normal” dynamics
driven by deﬁcits and “extraordinary” dynamics driven by escape dynamics. One of
our objectives is to use the likelihood function for inﬂation to spot when escape events
and reform events occurred. In addition to Marcet and Nicolini’s mechanical reforms
that eventually arrest escaping inﬂation, the richer dynamics that we attribute to the
deﬁcit allow another type of reform not allowed by Marcet and Nicolini (2003): an
exogenous shift in the deﬁcit regime. This type of reform allows us to ﬁt our model
over longer periods than would be appropriate for the Marcet and Nicolini (2003)
speciﬁcation, in particular, the periods that include both recurrent hyperinﬂations as
well as enduring stabilizations.
I.3. Related literature. Sargent and Wallace (1987) formed the likelihood function
for a rational expectations version of a model closely related to the one that we shall
study here. Their model has a continuum of rational expectations equilibria but
is nevertheless overidentiﬁed. A single parameter in the likelihood function indexes
the continuum of equilibria. Imrohoroglu (1993) estimated the Sargent and Wallace
(1987) model using data from German hyperinﬂation of the early 1920s and made in-
ferences about the prevailing rational expectations equilibrium. Because it assumed
a constant mean deﬁcit, the econometric setup in Sargent and Wallace (1987) andTHE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 5
Imrohoroglu (1993) was not designed to explain data series spanning periods of hy-
perinﬂation and their subsequent stabilizations.5 To explain such data, we modify
the model of Marcet and Nicolini (2003) while adhering to the maximum likelihood
philosophy of Sargent and Wallace (1987). Another strand of the literature uses game
theoretic ideas to develop models in which hyperinﬂations may be an important part of
an equilibrium path. In Zarazaga (1993) and Mondino, Sturzenegger, and Tommasi
(1996), conﬂict between diﬀerent groups in determining policy results in an equilib-
rium path where inﬂation may switch between phases of high and low rates. While
our model shares the features of switches in the rates of inﬂation, the mechanism
underlying it is quite diﬀerent.
Models of escapes have been used to model inﬂation rates and exchange rates
at moderate levels of inﬂation by Sargent (1999), Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002),
Sargent and Williams (2003), Cho and Kasa (2003), Kasa (2004), Tetlow and von zur Muehlen
(2004), and Ellison, Graham, and Vilmunen (2006).
I.4. Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents our model and a brief description of the likelihood function for histories of
inﬂation. We consign important details about the likelihood to appendix A. Section
III gives a brief account of the concepts of self-conﬁrming equilibria and conditional
self-conﬁrming equilibria that will guide our empirical interpretations. We relegate
computational details to appendix B. In section IV, we describe how to compute
the probabilities of two important events, namely, when beliefs escape and when
monetary reforms take place. Section V describes our estimation procedures and
results. Section VI then assembles these results into a set of interpretable economic
ﬁndings. Section VII then explores the ﬁt of our model relative to some alternatives.
To help us measure how far we have drifted from rational expectations, section VIII
computes stationary points of conditional self-conﬁrming equilibria and compares
them with stationary rational expectations inﬂation rates, deﬁned and computed in
appendix C, evaluated at our maximum likelihood parameter estimates. Section IX
concludes. Appendix D describes the deﬁcit data and discusses how we compute
statistics from our model to compare to this data. Finally, appendix E collects some
additional results.
II. The Model
Given a vector of parameters, the model induces a probability distribution over
sequences of inﬂation rates, money creation rates, deﬁcits, and a hidden Markov state.
5A recent paper by Adam, Evans, and Honkapohja (in press) is another theoretical model that
deals with a single episode of hyperinﬂation.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 6
We use this joint distribution to deduce a marginal distribution for a sequence of
inﬂation rates as a function of the model’s parameters: this is our likelihood function.
We maximize it to get parameter estimates. In this section, we describe the economic
forces at play on the way to constructing the likelihood function to be presented in
appendix A.
The model consists of a demand function for money, a government budget con-
straint, an exogenous process for ﬁscal deﬁcits, and a formulation that by slightly
retreating from rational expectations occasionally gives expectations a life of their
own in shaping the evolution of inﬂation.6 The money demand equation, the govern-













Mt = µMt¡1 + dt(mt;vt)Pt; (2)
dt(mt;vt) = ¹ d(mt) + ´dt(vt); (3)
Pr(mt+1 = ijmt = j) = qm;ij; i;j = 1;:::;mh; (4)
Pr(vt+1 = ijvt = j) = qv;ij; i;j = 1;:::;vh; (5)




is a Markov state,
as in Hamilton (1989) and Sclove (1983), that neither the agents inside the model nor
we the econometricians observe; Pt is the price level at time t; Mt is nominal balances
as a percent of output at time t; P e
t+1 is the public’s expectation of the price level
at time t + 1; and ´dt(vt) is an i.i.d. random shock. Each column of each transition
probability matrix Q` = [q`;ij] for ` = m;v sums to 1. The coeﬃcient ¹ d(mt) measures
the average deﬁcit, which via the government budget constraint equals the average
amount of seigniorage ﬁnanced by money creation in state mt. Thus, in what follows
we speak interchangeably of the ﬁscal or monetary deﬁcit. The two Markov chains





matrix Q = Qm ­ Qv.8 The total number of states is h = mh £ vh.
6Using adaptive rather than rational expectations also strengthens the role of the deﬁcit as a
fundamental that determines inﬂation. See Marimon and Sunder (1993) and the remarks in section
II.2.
7For an interpretation of this equation as a saving decision in a general equilibrium model, see
Marimon and Sunder (1993), Marcet and Nicolini 2003) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). Equa-
tion (2) was used by Friedman (1948) and Fischer (1982), among many others.
8We have also considered cases where mt and vt are not independent, but the ﬁt of these versions
of the model is much worse. See Section V.2 for a detailed discussion.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 7
Rather than imposing rational expectations, we follow Marcet and Sargent (1989b)






The public updates the belief ¯t by using a constant-gain algorithm:
¯t = ¯t¡1 + "(¼t¡1 ¡ ¯t¡1); (6)
where 0 < " << 1 and ¼t is the gross inﬂation rate at time t, deﬁned as
¼t = Pt=Pt¡1:
The model (1)-(5) makes inﬂation dynamics depend on °dt(k) where k 2 f1;:::;hg
and not on the individual parameters ° and dt(k) separately. Therefore, we have
Proposition 1 (Normalization). The dynamics of ¼t are unchanged if both dt(k) and
1=° are normalized by the same scale.
Proof. Let dt(k) and 1=° be multiplied by any real scalar ·. If we redeﬁne Pt to be
Pt=·, the system (1)-(5) remains unaﬀected. The redeﬁnition of the price level simply
means that the price index is re-based, which does not aﬀect the dynamics of either
Mt or ¼t. ¤
The normalization is eﬀectively a choice of units for the price level, about which our
model is silent because we deduce a joint density over inﬂation sequences only. Propo-
sition 1 explains why we have chosen to deviate from the procedure of Marcet and Nicolini
(2003), who treated ° and ¹ d(m) as separate parameters, and who interpreted the
calibrated value of dt to measure ﬁscal deﬁcits as a share of GDP. We think that
procedure is misleading because these parameters cannot be identiﬁed separately, so
that re-normalizing them in the manner of Proposition 1 gives the same equilibrium
outcome.9 For identiﬁcation purposes, therefore, when searching for the maximum
likelihood estimates, we normalize ° = 1. We shall eventually re-normalize it to
match the pertinent price level when we compute estimates of dt to compare with
some monetary deﬁcit data. It is important to note that such normalization aﬀects
only the mean of log dt or the median ¹ d(mt), but not the standard deviation of log
dt.
9For a general discussion of normalization in econometrics, see Hamilton, Waggoner, and Zha
(2004).THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 8
II.1. Deterministic steady states. A deterministic version of model (1) - (5) can
be obtained by ﬁxing the state mt = m 2 f1;:::;mhg and setting ´dt(vt) to zero for
all t. We now report equilibria from a perfect foresight version of the model where
agents observe and condition on the mean deﬁcit state m. Such equilibria are useful
reference points in the analysis of our stochastic adaptive model. As is well-known
by now, there are two deterministic steady states associated with each m.
Proposition 2. If
¹ d(m) < 1 + µ¸ ¡ 2
p
µ¸; (7)



































In stationary equilibrium, ¼t = ¼t¡1. Substituting this equality into the above equa-
tion leads to (8) and (9). ¤
We shall impose (7) in our empirical work. Note that the maximum value that
¹ d(m) can take and still have a steady state (SS) inﬂation rate exist is 1+µ¸¡2
p
µ¸.








II.2. Limit points of near deterministic dynamics. Marcet and Sargent (1989b)
and Marcet and Nicolini (2003) show that when the gain " is suﬃciently small, ¼t
converges to ¼¤
1 when the initial belief satisﬁes ¯0 < ¼¤
2(k).10 Marcet and Sargent
(1989b) describe how this outcome “reverses the dynamics” under rational expecta-
tions studied by Sargent and Wallace (1987), according to which ¼t converges to the
high steady state inﬂation rate ¼¤
2(k). The ¼¤
2(k) stationary point exhibits the per-
verse comparative statics property that stationary inﬂation rises when seigniorage
10They actually establish their convergence results for a learning scheme where the constant " is
replaced by 1=t. Our convergence results in appendix B use the constant gain speciﬁcation, which
changes the nature of the convergence.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 9
falls. We impute the constant gain (or adaptive expectations) learning scheme to
agents for two reasons. First, we want to arrest the perverse comparative dynamics
associated with rational expectations because we believe that normally higher deﬁcits
actually cause higher inﬂation and that imposing this feature on the model will help
to explain the data. Second, as noted earlier by Marcet and Sargent (1989b) and
Marcet and Nicolini (2003), in the presence of suﬃciently large shocks, the adaptive
expectations scheme creates the possibility that some big inﬂations are driven by dy-
namics of inﬂation expectations that are divorced from the fundamental force that
normally causes inﬂation, namely, the deﬁcit. We shall soon discuss such dynam-
ics under the moniker “escape dynamics”. But ﬁrst we state some restrictions on
parameters and outcomes that are necessary for our equilibrium to be well deﬁned.
II.3. Restrictions on parameters and outcomes. We return to the stochastic




1 ¡ ¸¯t ¡ dt(st)
; (11)
provided that both the numerator and denominator are positive. As shown in the
next section, the denominator must be bounded away from zero to ensure that the
moments of inﬂation exist and that the inﬂation dynamics converge. Therefore, to
guarantee existence of an equilibrium with positive prices and positive real balances,
we impose the following restrictions:
1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1 > 0; (12)
1 ¡ ¸¯t ¡ dt(st) > ±µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1): (13)
Condition (13) uses a small value ± > 0 to bound the denominator of (11) away
from zero. It follows that inﬂation is bounded by 1=±. Because the steady state
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) inﬂation rate is bounded by 1=¸ according
to Proposition 2, it follows that ¸ ¸ ±.
II.4. Cosmetic reforms. It is possible for a sequence of seigniorage shocks ´dt to
push ¯t beyond a point when the inﬂation dynamics will tend to push ¯t upward with-
out limit, in turn leading to an explosion of inﬂation driven by adverse expectations
dynamics. Unless we do something to arrest these dynamics, the model breaks down
in the sense that conditions (12) and (13) will ultimately be violated. We do this by
mechanically imposing a “reform” event: whenever these conditions are violated, we
simply reset inﬂation to the low steady state ¼¤





1(mt) + ´¼ t(mt); (14)THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 10
Table 1. Parameters and their meanings
Parameter(s) Feature
¸ demand for money
" expectations
¹ d(m) log deﬁcit mean
»(v) log deﬁcit inverse std
»¼ reform inverse std
Qm m- transition matrix
Qv v-transition matrix




When in addition 1 ¡ ¸¯t · ±µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1), then the model breaks down even with
dt = 0. In this case we also reset expectations so that ¯t = ¼t.11
We use this inelegant device of cutting inﬂation and expected inﬂation to represent
the cosmetic reforms that Latin American governments occasionally used in the 1980s
to arrest inﬂation without really altering the stochastic process for money-ﬁnanced
deﬁcits.12
II.5. Likelihood functions. As discussed in section V.1 below, we ﬁx the parame-
ters (µ;±) in estimation. Denote the remaining free parameters of the model as Á = £
¸ ¹ d(m) »d(v) »¼ " vec(Qm) vec(Qv)
¤
, where m = 1;:::;mh and v = 1;:::;vh.
The new parameters »d(v) and »¼ are the inverses of the variances for structural shocks
to deﬁcits and inﬂation and will be discussed in detail in appendix A. For conve-
nience, table 1 contains a reminder of the interpretations of these parameters. Let
¼t be a history of inﬂation from 1 to t, and similarly for the other variables. Given
a parameter vector, the model induces a joint density p(¼T;mT;vT;dT;MT;¯TjÁ),
11Marcet and Nicolini (2003) did not have this second clause in their reforms. We use it because
it helps to ﬁt the data. It has the interpretation that when agents see that the ﬁrst clause of
the cosmetic reform takes place with certainty, they are likely to adjust their belief quickly. If the
cosmetic reform is less certain (i.e., its probability is less than one), the public will continue to update
its belief according to the constant-gain algorithm. In principle, one could make reform of inﬂation
expectations depend on states by assuming that the agents can observe states or infer states from a
history of data. As discussed in section V.2, this speciﬁcation would make estimating the model an
insurmountable task.
12There were many cosmetic reforms in Latin America in the 1980s that sought to stabilize
inﬂation “on the cheap” without tackling ﬁscal deﬁcits. See Dornbusch (1985) for a contemporary
discussion and Marcet and Nicolini (2003) for a discussion of superﬁcial monetary reforms.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 11
where we set ¯0 = ¼0 and the probability for the initial unobservable composite state
s0 = [m0 v0] is set as described in appendix A. We follow the convention that the
initial observable ¼0 is always taken as given. The initial value M0 is a function of ¯0
and d0 has no eﬀect on the likelihood as long as ¼0 is given. We take the marginal
density p(¼TjÁ), viewed as a function of Á, as our likelihood function and compute
the estimator ^ Á = argmaxÁp(¼TjÁ). We make inferences about the deﬁcit from the
conditional density p(dTj¼T; ^ Á). Appendix A contains a detailed description of how
we construct the likelihood function.
III. Self-Confirming Equilibria
Although we are mostly interest in the dynamics of the model that arise under learn-
ing, it is useful to have a benchmark equilibrium notion that characterizes these dy-
namics. Following Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002), we adopt
the notion of a self-conﬁrming equilibrium (SCE) as a natural limiting concept and
reference point for learning models. In an SCE, agents’ beliefs are consistent with their
observations, though their beliefs may be incorrect about oﬀ-equilibrium events. In
appendix B, we deﬁne self-conﬁrming equilibria and conditional self-conﬁrming equi-
libria in terms of orthogonality conditions that will govern ¯ in large samples when
" ! 0. We also describe functions corresponding to the G(¯) function in ﬁgure 1 that
govern the dynamic behavior of ¯t as " ! 0. Appendix C then deﬁnes rational ex-
pectations equilibria and links them to conditional and unconditional self-conﬁrming
equilibria. Here we brieﬂy describe the main concepts.
An unconditional SCE is a ¯ that satisﬁes E¼t¡¯ = 0. For each mean deﬁcit state
m, a conditional SCE is a ¯(m) that satisﬁes
E[¼tjmt = m 8t] ¡ ¯(m) = 0
for m 2 f1;:::;mhg. A conditional SCE is thus just an unconditional SCE computed
on the (false) assumption that the mean deﬁcit state mt will always be m. Like the
deterministic steady state REEs, in general there are two conditional SCEs for each




2(m). As in our
discussion above, ¯¤
1(m) is a stable attractor of the beliefs, while ¯¤
2(m) marks the
edge of the domain of attraction of this stable SCE.
As we describe in appendix B, the conditional SCEs serve as good approximations
to REEs for very persistent average deﬁcit states. They interest us because our
estimate of p(mt = mj¼T; ^ Á) implies that the mean deﬁcit states are very persistent.
As we shall see, this makes a conditional SCE ¯(m) a good approximation to the
expected inﬂation rate in state m in a rational expectations equilibrium. It alsoTHE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 12
promises to make the conditional mean dynamics a good guide to the motion of ¯
in our adaptive model in mean deﬁcit state m. More formal details justifying and
qualifying these assertions are given in appendix B.
For each country, we construct mean dynamics for the conditional SCEs in each
deﬁcit state m. We report them for each of our ﬁve countries in our key ﬁgures 3-7
below. In section VII, they will help us to interpret the inﬂation histories in our
ﬁve countries in terms of convergence to a lower ﬁxed point, and escapes above the
higher ﬁxed point associated with the mean deﬁcit in state m. Later in section VIII,
they will help us evaluate how much our model deviates from a rational expectations
benchmark.
IV. Probabilities of Escape and Cosmetic Reform
When a sequence of seigniorage shocks ´dt pushes ¯t above the unstable SCE ¯¤
2(m),
we say that the inﬂation dynamics have escaped from the domain of attraction of the
low SCE inﬂation rate. When an escape has proceeded so far that a breakdown
threatens in the sense that (12)-(13) are violated, we impose the reform discussed in
Section II.4.
Escapes and reforms contribute important features to the likelihood function. To
give a formal deﬁnition of probabilities of escape and reform, we introduce the fol-
lowing notation:




¡ ¹ d(mt); (15)
!t(mt) = 1 ¡ ¸¯t ¡ ±µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1) ¡ ¹ d(mt): (16)
If ¯¤
2(mt) does not exist, we replace this term in (15) by ¼max
SS deﬁned in (10). In the
escape region, because actual inﬂation ¼t is higher than ¯t, both perceived inﬂation
and inﬂation itself tend to escalate and thus hyperinﬂation is likely to occur. The










where ¶(A) is an indicator function that returns 1 if the event A occurs and 0 otherwise
and F´d(k)(x) is the cumulative density function (cdf) of ´dt(k) evaluated at the value
x. The probability of reform at time t given the t ¡ 1 information set is:
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V. Estimation
V.1. Estimation procedure. In estimation we use the monthly CPI inﬂation for
each country published in the International Financial Statistics. These data sets
are relatively reliable and have samples long enough to cover the episodes of both
hyperinﬂation and low inﬂation. The long sample makes it reasonable to use the
Schwarz criterion to measure the ﬁt of our parsimonious model. The sample period
is 1957:02–2005:04 for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru and 1980:01–2005:04 for
Brazil.
There are no reliable or even available data on GDP, money, and the govern-
ment deﬁcit in many hyperinﬂation countries even on a quarterly basis because of
“poorly developed statistical systems” (Bruno and Fischer, 1990). However, as dis-
cussed above, we are able to estimate the structural parameters through the inﬂation
likelihood derived in appendix A. On the other hand, we may ask too much of the
model to pin down all the parameters from inﬂation data alone. Therefore we ﬁx the
values of the following three parameters as ¯0 = ¼0, µ = 0:99, and ± = 0:01. The value
of µ is consistent with economic growth and some cash taxes.13 The value of ± implies
that monthly inﬂation rates are bounded by 10;000%.14 Although we do not use it
in estimation, we do have annual data on seignorage which is described in appendix
D. As discussed below, we uses this data to validate our model by comparing the
distribution of deﬁcits predicted by the model with the actual data on seignorage.
Because of the long sample, the likelihood of inﬂation is well shaped around its
peak. There are local peaks but often the likelihood values at these locations are
essentially zero relative to the maximum likelihood (ML) value. Nonetheless, if one
chooses a poor starting point to search for the ML estimate, the numerical algorithm
is likely to lead to an estimate at a local peak.
15 Thus, obtaining the maximum
likelihood estimates (MLEs) proves to be an unusually challenging task. The op-
timization method we use combines the block-wise BFGS algorithm developed by
Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2006) and various constrained optimization routines con-
tained in the commercial IMSL package. The block-wise BFGS algorithm, following
13One could impose a prior distribution of µ with values ranging from 0:96 to 1:0. This is one of few
parameters we have a strong prior on. It is diﬃcult or impossible, however, to have a common prior
distribution on the other structural parameters because the likelihood shape diﬀers considerably
across countries. If we center a tight prior around the location as odds with the likelihood peak,
the model would be unduly penalized. It would be more informative to study the likelihood itself
and let the data determine what the model estimates are for each country. One could interpret our
likelihood approach as having a diﬀuse prior on the other structural parameters.
14Marcet and Nicolini (2003) set the bound at 5;000%.
15Such a problem is prevalent in Bayesian estimation.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 14
the idea of Gibbs sampling and EM algorithm, breaks the set of model parameters
into a few subsets and uses Sims’s csminwel program to maximize the likelihood
of one set of the model’s parameters conditional on the other sets.
16 This maxi-
mization is iterated at each subset until it converges. Then the optimization iterates
between the block-wise BFGS algorithm and the IMSL routines until it converges.
The convergence criterion is the square root of machine epsilon. Thus far we have
described the optimization process for only one starting point. We begin with a grid
of 300 starting points; after convergence, we perturb each maximum point in both
small and large steps to generate additional 200 new starting points and restart the
optimization process again; the MLEs are obtained at the highest likelihood value.
17
The other converged points typically have much lower likelihood values by at least a
magnitude of hundreds of log values.
V.2. Robustness analysis. In addition to the speciﬁcations described in section II,
we have studied a number of alternative speciﬁcations described in section VII below.
None of these alternatives has improved the ﬁt of our model. Further, one could in
principle let " or ¯t depend on regimes st. While this alternative creates no diﬃculty
in analyzing the theoretical model, it is infeasible to compute the likelihood function
because the unobservable variable ¯t depends on the entire history of regimes st (even
though st itself follows a Markov chain). For the model with bounded rationality,
moreover, it may make sense to assume that the agents do not know the regimes
while it is natural to assume that they know the regimes in the rational-expectations
model.
VI. Findings
In this section, we present and interpret our main empirical results. Before going
through the analysis country by country, we look at how some key parameters vary
across countries.
VI.1. Parameter patterns. Tables 6-10 in appendix E report the maximum likeli-
hood estimates of our model for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, respec-
tively, along with the estimated standard errors.18 As one can see, all the parameters
16The csminwel program can be found on http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/optimize/.
17For each country, the whole optimization process is completed in 5-10 days on a cluster of 14
dual-processors, using the parallel and grid computing package called STAMPEDE provided to us
by the Computing College of Georgia Institute of Technology.
18Following Sims (2001) and Hamilton, Waggoner, and Zha (2004), the standard errors are de-
rived from the covariance matrix that is computed as the inverse of the Hessian of logp(¦Tjµ)THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 15







are tightly estimated except »¼ in the case of Brazil. The standard error for the ele-
ment in the second row and second column of Qm for Chile implies a high likelihood
that the low deﬁcit regime would last forever. As for Peru, one can see that the high
deﬁcit regime is more persistent than the low and medium deﬁcit regimes.
For our ﬁve countries, table 2 reports our maximum likelihood estimates of the im-
portant discounting or elasticity parameter ¸ in equation (1) and the gain parameter
" that controls the rate at which past observations are discounted in the expectations
scheme (6). There are interesting cross country diﬀerences in these parameters. Bo-
livia has the lowest ¸ and the highest ", indicating that it discounted future money
creation rates the most through a low elasticity of the demand for money with respect
to expected inﬂation, while it also discounted past rates of inﬂation the most through
a high gain in the expectations scheme. Comparing Bolivia’s (¸;") with Chile’s shows
expected inﬂation to be more important in the demand for money and expectations
to discount past observations much less in Chile.
In general, the smaller ¸ is, the less likely it is that an escape will take place because
the domain of attraction of the low SCE inﬂation rate is larger. Once in the escape
region, a large value of " tends to accelerate increases in both inﬂation and beliefs ¯.
An informative example is Brazil where both ¸ and " are large. For Argentina, Chile,
and Peru, the value of ¸ is even larger and consequently the probabilities of escape
are quite high during the hyperinﬂation period. For Bolivia, the value of ¸ is quite
low. Thus, even though its estimated gain is higher than those in the other countries,
the domain of attraction of the low SCE is large enough to prevent the escape event
from occurring during the hyperinﬂation period. We return to these observations in
our country-by-country analysis below.
VI.2. The key ﬁgures. We use ﬁgures 3-7 below to breathe life into our maximum
likelihood estimates for each country. Each of these ﬁgures consists of ﬁve panels
evaluated at the MLEs. The estimated values of ¹ d are re-normalized to be consistent with the data,
as we describe in appendix D.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 16
aligned to reveal features of our estimated model. The top left panel contains two or
three curves that depict the conditional mean dynamics for ¯ and whose zeros depict
conditional self-conﬁrming equilibria evaluated at the maximum likelihood parameters
^ Á for the country under study. The SCEs are conditional on the diﬀerent estimated
average deﬁcits measured by ¹ d(m). There are three curves when the Markov state
for the mean deﬁcit can take three values and two curves when we allow it to take
only two values. These curves are empirical renditions of the G(¯) functions in ﬁgure
1 at the diﬀerent levels of the mean deﬁcits we have estimated. We have projected
the zeros from these ﬁgures as horizontal dotted lines into the top right panel, which
plots our estimates of the public’s inﬂation beliefs ¯t over time. These dotted lines
tell us the stable (the lower values) and unstable (the higher values) of beliefs for
each deﬁcit level and help us to identify the range of ¯’s that qualify as escapes and
reforms.
The panel that is the second from the top compares bars that are seigniorage rates
constructed from annual data along with the 0:16;0:5;0:84 probability quantiles for
dt predicted by our model (which recall uses only inﬂation data for estimation). See
Appendix D for the details of how these numbers are computed in the data and the
model. The dashed lines in the graph contains two-thirds of the probability distri-
bution of simulated annual deﬁcits from our model; the solid line labelled “Model”
represents the median of simulated annual deﬁcits.19 For all countries, it is striking
that the deﬁcits constructed from actual data seem to follow relatively closely the
patterns that the model predicts and about which the quantiles constructed from
p(dTj¼T; ^ Á) are informative.
The third panel from the top records probabilities of two events that we have
computed from the joint density p(¼T;dTj^ Á). The thick solid line, denoted “L Deﬁcit”
when there are two mean states (or “L & M Deﬁcit” when there are three mean states),
is the probability that the mean deﬁcit regime is in the low deﬁcit state (or either
the low or the medium state in the three-mean deﬁcit case) as a function of time.
The dashed line is the probability that an escape will occur next period, computed
as described in section IV above. Figures 10-14 in appendix E plot the full suite of
probabilities of the mean deﬁcit and deﬁcit shock variance regimes for each country.
The bottom panel shows the actual inﬂation history ¼T and the history of one-
step ahead estimates produced by our model evaluated at ^ Á, conditioning on earlier
inﬂation rates. Later, we shall compare the ﬁt of this model with a good-ﬁtting
19We report quantiles because our model makes the distribution of dt a fat-tailed mixture of
log normal distributions. When the deﬁcit shock variance is large with a high average amount of
seigniorage, the deﬁcit distribution is quite skewed with a very fat tail.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 17
autoregression constructed without imposing our economic model. Here we note
simply that the model tends to track the data relatively well, particularly in the
hyperinﬂation episodes.
We now use these ﬁgures to tell what our estimates say about the histories of
inﬂation in these ﬁve countries.
VI.3. Argentina. The top left panel of ﬁgure 3 shows curves for two conditional
self-conﬁrming equilibrium dynamics. The one associated with the high m state
has its higher ﬁxed point at a value for log¯ of about 0:2, while the low m state
has a low stable point near zero. Comparing ¯t in the top right panel with the
probabilities in the third panel down on the right shows that throughout the 1960s
up until 1975 the economy was repeatedly in the low deﬁcit regime, the probability
of escape was very low, and expected inﬂation hovered around the low conditional
SCE. The low probability for the low deﬁcit state in the third panel on the right
shows that after 1975 up until 1991, Argentina lived with a chronically high mean
deﬁcit. The second panel from the top shows that our model predicts higher and more
volatile deﬁcits throughout this period, and this is largely conﬁrmed in the annual
deﬁcit data. Throughout this period, expected inﬂation drifted higher and higher (as
shown in the ﬁrst panel on the right), ﬁrst tending toward the stable conditional SCE
around 0.1 associated with the high m state, then going even higher. The bottom
panel shows that actual inﬂation drifted upward during this period, with spikes of
very high inﬂation in 1976 and 1984, driven largely by the shocks to the deﬁcits.
Again, looking at the third panel, the probability of escape becomes large when ¯
approaches and ﬁnally exceeds that higher ﬁxed point near 0.2 in 1989 and 1990. As
expected inﬂation increased rapidly in 1990 actual inﬂation (as shown in the bottom
panel) increased even more rapidly, leading to a dramatic hyperinﬂationary episode.
The high deﬁcit conditional dynamics indicate that if Argentina had been lucky
enough to avoid sequences of adverse deﬁcit shocks that drove ¯ above the stable
rest point near 0.1, it could have avoided the kind of big inﬂation associated with
an escape. Our estimates say that it was thus lucky until the late 1980s, when the
escape probability escalated and an escape occurred. From 1991-1992, the inﬂation
fell rapidly as shown in the bottom panel. Our model attributes this stabilization to
switches in the Markov states governing the mean and volatility of the deﬁcit, which
remained in a lower and less volatile regime for most of the rest of the sample. Again,
this is conﬁrmed by the second panel, which shows smaller deﬁcits throughout the
later 1990s, apart from a period of volatility associated with the crisis in 2002. This
change in the mean deﬁcit state shifted the conditional dynamics curve (in the top
left panel)in a way that pushed expected inﬂation rapidly downward, with beliefs (inTHE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 18




















































Figure 3. Argentina.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 19
the top right panel) eventually converging down toward the lower conditional SCE
once again. Although the change in the deﬁcit state and the decline in the actual
inﬂation rate occurred relatively quickly, expected inﬂation fell throughout the last
years of the sample because the estimated gain " is small.
VI.4. Bolivia. Our results for Bolivia tell a substantially diﬀerent story. Our esti-
mates suggest that the escape dynamics emphasized by Marcet and Nicolini (2003)
played no role in Bolivia. The most striking thing about the conditional dynamics
in the top left panel of ﬁgure 4 is how spread out the conditional SCEs are in each
regime. As noted above, this is governed in our model by the money demand elas-
ticity parameter ¸, whose estimated value in Bolivia is quite low. Thus, the stable
conditional SCEs are near zero and 0.2 in the low and high m states, respectively, but
the high SCEs that mark the edge of the domain of attraction are both over 1.0. As
the top right panel shows, the beliefs ¯t never get into the region where the unstable
dynamics take over. This is conﬁrmed by the third panel of the ﬁgure, which shows
that the escape probabilities are very small throughout the entire sample, so small
that it is hard to detect by eye from the third panel on the right.
Since the learning dynamics play very little part in Bolivia, our model suggests that
the dynamics of inﬂation in this country are almost entirely driven by the dynamics of
seignorage revenue. As shown in the third panel, our estimates indicate that a switch
to the high mean deﬁcit state took place around 1982, a view that is conﬁrmed by
the deﬁcit data shown in the second panel. Throughout most of the sample our
model predicts a low and relatively stable level of monetized deﬁcits, with a large and
volatile period in the mid-1980s, and this is essentially what the data show. With this
switch to a higher m state, expected inﬂation increases (top panel) and the country
experiences a hyperinﬂation (bottom panel) driven both by the higher mean inﬂation
and large shocks (notice the relatively large discrepancy between the predicted and
actual inﬂation in this period). However, around 1987 the economy switches back
to the low and more stable deﬁcit regimes (third panel), actual deﬁcits are lower
and more stable (second panel), expected inﬂation falls back down toward the lower
stable conditional SCE (top panel), and actual inﬂation is stabilized at a low level
(bottom panel). This country thus illustrates the importance of allowing the data to
determine the causes of hyperinﬂation, whether due to learning dynamics or largely
driven by fundamentals. Bolivia is a prime example of the importance of the ﬁscal
determination of hyperinﬂation.
VI.5. Brazil. Brazil, as shown in ﬁgure 5, presents an interesting case study with
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Figure 5. Brazil.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 22
means. First note that in the top panel on the left the low average deﬁcit state has
a conditional SCE near zero, the medium deﬁcit’s SCE is near 0.06, but the high
mean deﬁcit conditional dynamics curve has no ﬁxed points. We interpret this as
asserting that when the economy is in this deﬁcit regime, expected inﬂation is likely
to increase steadily and an escape will occur unless the country is lucky enough to
have a sequence of negative shocks that push it far enough below that high conditional
mean.
Our estimates suggest that from 1980-1985 the economy was in the medium deﬁcit
state, as evidenced by the regime probabilities in the third panel down and the pre-
dictions and actual levels of deﬁcits in the second panel. Throughout this period,
expected inﬂation was near the medium deﬁcit SCE (top right panel) and actual in-
ﬂation was moderately high but relatively stable (bottom panel). However, between
1985 and 1987 the economy shifted to the high average deﬁcit state, remaining there
until 1994. Again, this is clear from the regime probabilities in the third panel and
the deﬁcit predictions and data in the second panel.20 Once the economy entered this
regime, the unstable learning dynamics kicked in. The escape probabilities in the
third panel rose repeatedly after 1985, remaining mostly near one after 1987 up until
1994, and there were volatile but high deﬁcits during this period. Expected inﬂation
increased rapidly from 1987 through 1991 (top panel) and actual inﬂation skyrocketed
(bottom panel). In the graph, the predicted value for this ﬁrst hyperinﬂation is about
3 in log points. We truncate the ﬁgure at 0:7 log points in order to make the actual
and predicted inﬂation paths more discernible.
Actual inﬂation fell from its peak in 1991 (bottom panel), while the economy con-
tinued to run large deﬁcits that necessitated money creation (second panel). Thus,
our model interprets the recurrent inﬂations and stabilizations before 1994 in the
manner of Marcet and Nicolini (2003), namely, as recurrent escapes followed by su-
perﬁcial mechanical reforms that cut inﬂation but leave the mean deﬁcit unaltered.
These reforms succeeded in lowering expected inﬂation temporarily (top panel), but it
rose rapidly again until 1994, with actual inﬂation rising again to another peak (bot-
tom panel). However, unlike the earlier cosmetic reforms, our model says that the
1994 stabilization is diﬀerent, and was accompanied by a persistent reduction in the
mean and volatility of the monetized deﬁcit. This is evident in the lower predicted
deﬁcits in the second panel, which largely accords with the lower and more stable
actual deﬁcits (apart from 2002). After 1994, beliefs fell rapidly down to the low
deﬁcit SCE (top panel), and actual inﬂation remained stable at a low level (bottom
20Note that regime probabilities are computed on a monthly basis while the annual deﬁcit is an
average of monthly deﬁcits as discussed in appendix D.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 23
panel). Moreover, as shown in table 8 in appendix E, our estimates of the transition
probabilities Qm suggest that the high and medium deﬁcit regimes are transitory,
and thus our model predicts the sustained stable inﬂation that accompanies the low
deﬁcit regime. Thus, Brazil provides an interesting example of the ultimate futility
of the cosmetic reforms, followed by a successful sustained ﬁscal reform.
VI.6. Chile. In ﬁgure 6 we consider the case of Chile, whose experience again is
rather distinct from the other countries. First note that the scale in the top panels
is signiﬁcantly smaller than the other countries, with the low deﬁcit state having
conditional SCEs near 0.03 and 0.12, and the high deﬁcit state having essentially
one rest point near 0.07. Thus, even the escapes in Chile are consistent with much
lower inﬂation rates than in Brazil. Moreover, the deﬁcit levels themselves do not
vary sizeably across regimes, as the median model prediction in the second panel is
essentially ﬂat over the entire sample. The probabilities of the low deﬁcit in the third
panel are relatively volatile before 1994 (as reﬂected by relatively volatile inﬂation
rates), but these do not translate into volatile predictions. Thus, our estimates suggest
that the buildup and spike in inﬂation in the mid 1970s (bottom panel) was caused
by a sustained run of high deﬁcits, largely driven by economy entering the high
shock variance state. This is evident in the second panel, where although the median
prediction remains ﬂat in the 1970s, there is a large tail evident in the distribution
of deﬁcits, so that the predictive distribution covers the increase that we observe
in the data. These shocks caused beliefs to drift upward (top panel), increasing
the probability of escape (third panel), and leading to the hyperinﬂation observed
(bottom panel).
Because the buildup in inﬂation was largely driven by shocks, the stabilization in
the late 1970s is interpreted as a reduction of variance of shocks to deﬁcits. Beliefs
drift continually downward after 1978 (top panel), and inﬂation remains relatively
low throughout the rest of the sample (bottom panel), apart from a short-lived spike
around 1985. Cosmetic reforms play little role for Chile, as their probabilities remain
very low even during the runaway inﬂation period. Thus, Chile is again an example
of the importance of ﬁscal policy for inﬂation. But although ﬁscal reforms play some
role in bringing down hyperinﬂation in the 1970s, deﬁcit shocks are the driving force
in the conquest of Chilean inﬂation. After the tumult of the 1970s the economy
engaged in a more stable ﬁscal policy, resulting in relatively stable inﬂation.
VI.7. Peru. Figure 7 considers the case of Peru. The third panel down makes clear
that throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the economy was in the low and
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Figure 7. Peru.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 26
these regimes, as the second panel shows that the median prediction is relatively
ﬂat, which roughly matches the annual deﬁcit data. Expected inﬂation was relatively
low throughout this period (top panel), remaining near the conditional SCEs that
are at 0.016 and 0.029 for the low and medium states, and the actual inﬂation rate
was relatively low and stable as well (bottom panel). However, around 1978 our
model suggests that the economy entered into a high deﬁcit regime (third panel) that
persisted all the way until 1993. This is conﬁrmed by the persistently high seignorage
revenues shown in the second panel. But inﬂation did not accelerate immediately.
Rather, beliefs drifted upward throughout the 1980s to the stable conditional SCE in
the high state (top panel) and inﬂation climbed slowly with it (bottom panel).
But as we have seen in the other countries, the high deﬁcit state is precarious and a
sequence of deﬁcit shocks was enough to upset the balance. In 1989 expected inﬂation
increased rapidly, traversing into the region that prompted a large and rapid escape,
as is evident in the belief dynamics in the top panel and the sharp increase in the
escape probability in the third panel. Inﬂation itself increased even more dramatically
(bottom panel), triggering a deﬁnite cosmetic reform. In other countries, cosmetic
reforms occur with probability less than one and thus only inﬂation itself is reset. Peru
is the only country that experiences a cosmetic reform with certainty, which evokes
expectations to be reset as well. We interpret this double-barreled intervention as a
reform that, although it does not alter the deﬁcit dynamics, is credible in the sense
that the public believed it to be eﬀective in cutting inﬂation. Consequently, expected
and actual inﬂation jump down dramatically in 1992. Moreover, unlike the failure
of the initial cosmetic reforms in Brazil where there is no SCE in the high-deﬁcit
regime, these reforms seemed to have been successful in Peru, where there is a large
gap between the low and high SCEs in the high-deﬁcit state. Consistent with the high-
deﬁcit SCE around 0.08, inﬂation remained relatively low and stable throughout the
rest of the sample (bottom panel), even though the economy remained in the high
average deﬁcit state for a considerable time. Evidence of a ﬁscal reform is absent
until 1995, when the probability assigned to the low or medium monetized deﬁcit
state increased nearly to one (third panel). Thus, Peru seems to be the case where
the unorthodox cosmetic reforms discussed by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) were the
most successful in vanquishing hyperinﬂation.
VI.8. Comparison with Marcet and Nicolini. We now illustrate how our model
diﬀers from the model of Marcet and Nicolini (2003), which is geared toward explain-
ing the experience of Argentina. We have formed the distribution conditioned on the
history of inﬂation that is implied by their quarterly model at their calibrated param-
eter values. Figure 8 reports the one-step forecasts and 90% probability distributionalTHE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 27





























Figure 8. Marcet and Nicolini (2003) model’s one-step prediction
with 90% probability bands for Argentina.
bands around them, together with actual inﬂation outcomes. This ﬁgure should be
compared with the bottom panel of ﬁgure 3. For Marcet and Nicolini’s calibrated
parameter values, we have found that there is no SCE, so that the ordinate of their
G(¯) curve (see ﬁgure 1) always exceeds zero. This means that inﬂation expecta-
tions are perpetually along an escape path that must terminate with a mechanical
monetary reform that will reset inﬂation itself. This seems to be the reason that in
ﬁgure 8 the Marcet-Nicolini constant-parameter economic model over-predicts actual
inﬂation in the relatively low inﬂation periods preceding 1975 and following 1991. By
considering a more general deﬁcit process, our model is thus able to capture both the
hyperinﬂations and the stabilizations.
VII. The Model’s Fit
Since our theoretical model is highly restricted, one would not expect its ﬁt to come
even close to be as good as a standard autoregressive (AR) model, let alone a time-
varying AR model. In previous work with models like ours, such as Marcet and Nicolini
(2003), only certain moments or correlations of the model were typically reported andTHE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 28
Table 3. Log likelihood adjusted by the Schwarz criterion
Constant Best-ﬁt Best-ﬁt AR(2) log posterior odds
Argentina 980.9 (df=8) 1275.4 1346.1 (df=0) -70.7
Bolivia 1248.1 (df=8) 1540.0 1547.2 (df=0) -7.1
Brazil 510.7 (df=9) 814.6 853.6 (df=-1) -39.0
Chile 1422.3 (df=8) 1745.9 1721.7 (df=0) 24.14
Peru 1378.1 (df=8) 1711.7 1658.7 (df=0) 52.8
compared to the data. By contrast, in this paper we take the ﬁt of our model seriously
and report it against the ﬂexible, unrestricted statistical models. We compare not
only various versions within our model but also our model with diﬀerent types of AR
models.
For each country we have tried more than two dozen versions of our theoretical
model and of the unrestricted atheoretical models. Some of the diﬀerent variations
include the models with constant parameters, with 2-5 states for ¹ d(st) and ´dt(st)
jointly, for ¹ d(st) only, for ´dt(st) only, and for ¹ d(s1t) and ´dt(s2t) where s1t and s2t are
independent state variables. If the number of states is 3 for mt and 2 for v2t, we call
it a 3 £ 2 model. By the Schwarz criterion (SC) or Bayesian information criterion,21
the 2 £ 3 version of the model ﬁts best for Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile and the
3£2 version is the best for Brazil and Peru; all other versions including the constant-
parameter case ﬁt worse. With the 3-state case, we follow Sims, Waggoner, and Zha
(2006) and restrict the probability transition matrix to be of the following form:
2
4
Â1 (1 ¡ Â2)=2 0
1 ¡ Â1 Â2 1 ¡ Â3
0 (1 ¡ Â2)=2 Â3
3
5;
where Âj’s are free parameters to be estimated.
In addition, we have tried a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model. For
example, we have let ¼¤
t and dt be serially correlated with their parameters freely
estimated, and allowed »¼ to be time varying. We have also allowed ¹ d(mt) to be neg-
ative, used a number of diﬀerent distributions for ´¼ and ´d, including the truncated
normal distribution used by Marcet and Nicolini (2003), and introduced more lagged
inﬂation variables in the learning rule (6). Again, within each model, the ﬁt in most
versions is substantially worse than our best-ﬁtting model and thus we do not report
their results.
21See Sims (2001) for detailed discussions of how to use the SC for model comparison.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 29
Table 3 reports the log likelihood (adjusted by the Schwarz criterion) of the best-
ﬁtting theoretical model for each country, the constant-parameter theoretical model
as in Marcet and Nicolini (2003), and the best-ﬁtting unrestricted regime-switching
AR model.22 The constant-parameter model for every country ﬁts poorly; this result
is consistent with the analysis in section VI.8. For all the ﬁve countries, the best-
ﬁtting atheoretical model is the 2£2 AR(2), which allows the two states in coeﬃcients
to be independent of the two states in shock variances. Our best-ﬁtting theoretical
model is used as a baseline for comparison. The notation “df” stands for degrees of
freedom in relation to the baseline model. The last column reports the posterior odds
of the best-ﬁtting economic model relative to the best-ﬁtting statistical model. The
table shows that our model ﬁts worse than the best ﬁtting atheoretical model for
Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, while it ﬁts better for in the cases of Chile and Peru.
However, even in countries such as Argentina and Brazil, where our model ﬁts worse
overall, the discrepancy is largely driven by the superior performance of the statistical
models in the non-hyperinﬂation episodes. For the hyperinﬂations, our model does
as well or better than the atheoretical models. These points are illustrated by ﬁgures
15-19 in appendix E, where we compare the log conditional likelihood p(¼tj¼t¡1; ^ Á)
of our theoretical model with that of the best-ﬁtting statistical model. Clearly, the
ﬁt is much better for our theoretical model than the statistical model during the
period of hyperinﬂation. Take Argentina as an example. The log likelihood for
the non-hyperinﬂation periods 1957:04-1974:12 and 1993:01-2004:04 is 1014.4 for the
statistical model and 948.1 for the theoretical model. This diﬀerence is 66.2, which
captures most of the diﬀerence between the ﬁts of the two models. Similarly, the
log likelihood for the hyperinﬂation period 1979:01-1987:12 in Bolivia is 133.0 for our
theoretical model and 117.6 for the statistical model, so the ﬁt is much better for
our model during this period. Thus, while our model is not an unqualiﬁed empirical
success, it does a reasonably good job of capturing much of the inﬂation dynamics
in these countries. Moreover the validation of our model provided by the monetary
deﬁcit data, as well as the insight that it provides into the causes and consequences
of inﬂation make us regard it as a clear economic success.
VIII. Comparing SCEs and REEs
We now examine what our estimates imply for the self-conﬁrming and rational
expectations equilibria discussed above and deﬁned formally in appendices B and
22Regime-switching AR models considered here are simply a special case of regime-switching VAR
models developed by Sims and Zha (2006) and by Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2006).THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 30
Table 4. Conditional SCEs and REEs. Log value of beliefs in each regime.
Country SCE/REE Low m Medium m High m
Argentina SCE 0.0123 - 0.1018
Argentina REE 0.0188 - 0.0902
Bolivia SCE 0.0153 - 0.1804
Bolivia REE 0.0165 - 0.1711
Brazil SCE 0.0064 0.0632 0.2256
Brazil REE 0.0063 0.0726 0.2299
Chile SCE 0.0346 - 0.0743
Chile REE 0.0378 - 0.0612
Peru SCE 0.0163 0.0288 0.0853
Peru REE 0.0186 0.0332 0.0833
C. As we have emphasized, key parts of our story for the dynamics of hyperinﬂa-
tions require retreating from rational expectations. We argue here that the retreat is
relatively minor.
In particular, Table 4 lists the conditional SCEs for each country, along with the
beliefs from a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) consistent with low inﬂation.
(As we discuss in appendix C, there are many other REEs as well.) The table makes
quite clear that the conditional SCEs that govern the dynamics of our adaptive agents’
beliefs are very close to the REE beliefs. In most cases, the diﬀerences are well within
half of a percentage point, with the largest diﬀerences being slightly more than one
percentage point. The values in the low m (average deﬁcit) state in particular are
very close for all countries.23 Moreover the REEs are computed under the assumption
that agents observe and condition on the mean deﬁcit state mt. Since our adaptive
agents’ beliefs converge in distribution to these conditional SCEs, this suggests that
on average agents in our model do not make systematic forecast errors. Even though
they do not observe and do not condition on the Markov state governing the average
deﬁcit, they are able to adapt their beliefs over time in such a way that this omission
is not very costly to them. Thus, our departure from full rationality is rather small.
But by making this departure, we change in important ways the dynamics of the
model and allow the data to inform us as to the underlying causes and consequences
of the South American inﬂations.
23Brazil was a special case in that there is no conditional SCE in the high average deﬁcit regime.
Similarly, we were not able to ﬁnd a low inﬂation REE. The table reports the “near equilibria” that
have the lowest forecast errors, and correspond to the minimal value of the mean dynamics in the
high seignorage state.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 31
Table 5. Causes for the rise and fall of hyperinﬂation across countries
Escape No Escape
Cosmetic Reform Brazil (87-91)
Peru (87-92)
Fiscal Deﬁcit Reform Argentina (87-91) Bolivia (82-86)
Brazil (92-95)
No Reform (Driven by Chile (71-78) Argentina (76-86)
Deﬁcit Shocks)
IX. Concluding remarks
Building on Sargent and Wallace (1987) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003), we have
formulated a nonlinear stochastic model of inﬂation, expectations, and money-supply
ﬁnanced deﬁcits and then ﬁt the implied density over histories of inﬂation to data for
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. Figures 3-7 summarize the stories that
our maximum likelihood estimates tell about the inﬂation histories of these countries.
IX.1. Types of inﬂations and stabilizations. Table 5 brieﬂy summarizes some of
the key empirical patterns revealed by Figures 3-7. The ﬁrst column lists three possi-
ble ways that our model tells us hyperinﬂation can be stopped: a superﬁcial monetary
reform that mechanically resets inﬂation without altering the deﬁcit regime, a ﬁscal
deﬁcit reform activated by a change in the mean monetary deﬁcit, and no reform
in the mean monetary deﬁcit but a change in the conditional deﬁcit shock variance.
The top row lists the two possible causes of hyperinﬂation: a high probability of
self-perpetuating escalation of inﬂation governed by escape dynamics, and a large
deﬁcit shock variance coupled with a small probability of escape. We chose to put
countries into appropriate boxes in the table according to whether our model assigns
high probabilities (i.e., over 60%) of escape or of a cosmetic reform.
In March of 1990, for example, Brazilian inﬂation reached its peak with a monthly
gross rate of 1:82. In the next two months, the inﬂation rate dropped to 1:15 then 1:07.
The probability of cosmetic monetary reform is 67:5% for March, 75:6% for April, and
47:8% for May. By contrast, the high and volatile inﬂation episode in Brazil ﬁnally
ended in 1994 with a sustained ﬁscal reform. Peru is another informative example. In
August of 1990, the Peruvian monthly inﬂation rate reached 4:97, was brought down
to 1:14 in September, and stayed at a relatively low level around 1:1 for a number of
months thereafter. The probability of cosmetic reform is only 10:8% in August butTHE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 32
jumps to 100% in September. Expected inﬂation is so high that the reform resets
inﬂation expectations as well as inﬂation, which brings down the belief instantly.24
Thus, the cosmetic reform is crucial for interpreting the fall of hyperinﬂation in Peru.
For Argentina (from 1987 to 1991), Bolivia, and Brazil, ﬁscal reforms play a dom-
inant role in conquering hyperinﬂation. A reduction of the variance of shocks to
deﬁcits can be also important, as seen in Chile and Argentina (from 1976 to 1986).
IX.2. Ergodic distributions for deﬁcits. Figure 9 plots the ergodic probabilities
of the estimated average deﬁcit level and the estimated standard deviation of deﬁcit
shocks. As we have seen, in the high average deﬁcit states, inﬂation tends to be high on
average and there is typically a sizeable probability of escaping to hyperinﬂation. This
chance is even greater when the variance of the deﬁcit shocks is larger. These ergodic
probabilities are therefore helpful in predicting the long run inﬂation experiences
of the diﬀerent countries in our sample. Countries whose ergodic distribution has
signiﬁcant mass in the high average deﬁcit and high shock variance states will thus
tend to experience repeated episodes of high inﬂation and hyperinﬂation. In contrast,
countries where most of the mass is in low mean deﬁcits and small shocks will tend
to have low and stable inﬂation. Clearly, Brazil and Chile have deﬁcit processes that
are conducive to persistent low inﬂation, while Argentina and Peru do not. Bolivia
is an intermediate case, suggestive of mostly low inﬂation perhaps interrupted by
occasional periods of high inﬂations.
IX.3. The epigraphs. We conclude by returning to the thoughtful epigraphs of
Dornbusch (1985) and Fischer (1987) with which we began. The articles in which
those quotes appear testify to how the available inﬂation, deﬁcit, and other macroe-
conomic data had left informed observers like Dornbusch and Fischer undecided about
the ultimate sources of inﬂation dynamics. While not including the indexation ar-
rangements that Dornbusch suspected contributed so much to inﬂation dynamics, our
model makes important concessions in his direction by treating the mean deﬁcit as
a hidden Markov state whose eﬀects on inﬂation are confounded by noise and ob-
scured by shocks to deﬁcits and perturbations to expectations and therefore have to
be gently coaxed from the data. And we have taken Fischer’s doubts about the pure
rational expectations model of Sargent and Wallace (1987) seriously by backing away
from rational expectations just enough to make room for the escapes and reforms
that help our model to explain the data and interpret the histories.
24Without this resetting, the cosmetic reform of Marcet and Nicolini (2003) would have stayed
with probability one for the next eleven months because of the unusually high values of expected



































































































































Figure 9. Ergodic probability given the estimated average deﬁcit level
(x-axis) and the estimated standard deviation of deﬁcit shocks (y-axis).THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 34
Appendix A. Deriving the Likelihood
We ﬁrst derive a likelihood conditional on the hidden composite states st = [mt vt]
and then integrate over states to ﬁnd the appropriate unconditional likelihood. We
assume that the probability distribution of ´¼ t(k) is truncated log-normal and that
the distribution of ´dt(k) is log-normal for k = 1;:::;h where h = mh £ vh. This
general setup includes both the case where mt and vt are independent and the case
where mt = vt. Speciﬁcally, the probability density functions are
p¼ (´¼ t(k)) =
8
> > > <































2¼¾d(k)(¹ d(k)+´d t(k)) if ´dt(k) > ¡¹ d(k)
0 if ´dt(k) · ¡¹ d(k)
; (A2)
where ©(x) is the standard normal cdf of x. We use the convention that log(0) = ¡1






and let Á be a collection of all structural parameters. We use the tilde above ´dt(st)
to indicate that ~ ´dt(st) is a random variable, whereas ´dt(st) is the realized value
associated with ¼t. The following proposition provides the key component of the
overall likelihood function.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 35








































j»d(st)j(log(max[(1 ¡ ¸¯t) ¡ ±µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1);0]) ¡ logd(st))
¤´
;
C2t = ¶f¯t¡1 < 1=¸g ¶
½
µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1)











With some algebraic work, one can show from (A1) and (A2) that Equation (A3) is
equivalent to the following expression
¶f¯t¡1 ¸ 1=¸g p¼(¼t ¡ ¼
¤






















where Pr[] is the probability that the event in the brackets occurs.
Consider the case where ¯t¡1 < 1=¸ (the other case is trivial). Denote
Lt =
µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1)
max(1 ¡ ¸¯t; ±µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1))


















































































As shown in Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2006), one can also use the above recursive
structure to compute the smoothed probability of st, Pr(stj¼T;Á).THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 37
Appendix B. Self-Confirming Equilibria
This appendix describes self-conﬁrming equilibrium versions of our model, while
appendix C below describes rational expectations equilibria. We do not estimate
either of these types of equilibria. However, by estimating the adaptive model of
section II, we recover all the parameters that are required to compute such equilibria.
In section VIII, we compute such equilibria for our estimated parameter values.
B.1. Small gain convergence. If the agents in our model were to implement a least
squares estimator by replacing " in the updating rule (6) by t¡1, we would expect ¯t to
converge to a constant level of expected inﬂation that equals the actual unconditional
mean rate of inﬂation. Such a constant average level of gross inﬂation is a special
case of a self-conﬁrming equilibrium (SCE) as described by Sargent (1999).25 We
ﬁnd such an unconditional SCE by computing a small gain limit for the beliefs of
the adaptive agents under our model. We also consider a small variation limit in
which the transition probabilities of the average deﬁcit state mt become degenerate,
leading us to a notion of a conditional self-conﬁrming equilibrium. As we’ve seen,
these equilibria are important reference points for characterizing the belief dynamics.
B.1.1. Self-conﬁrming equilibria. A self-conﬁrming equilibrium (SCE) is a ﬁxed point
of beliefs, ¯, that is consistent with what the agents observe and solves the following
population orthogonality condition:
E [¼t ¡ ¯] = 0; (A7)
where ¼t is itself a function of ¯.
Let:
!(¯t;¯t¡1) = 1 ¡ ¸¯t ¡ ±µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1):
As we implement a “reform” by setting ¼t randomly in the way described in equation
(14), we have:
¼t = ¶(dt(st) < !(¯t;¯t¡1))
µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1)
1 ¡ ¸¯t ¡ dt(st)
+ ¶(dt(st) ¸ !(¯t;¯t¡1))¼
¤
t(st):
Hence, we can write (6) as:
¯t+1 = ¯t + "g(¯t;¯t¡1;dt;¼
¤
t) (A8)
25We have assumed that agents do not know the current regime st = (mt;vt) when forecasting
inﬂation. Better informed agents would incorporate knowledge of st in forecasting inﬂation (see




t) = ¶(dt < !(¯t;¯t¡1))
µ(1 ¡ ¸¯t¡1)
1 ¡ ¸¯t ¡ dt
+ ¶(dt ¸ !(¯t;¯t¡1))¼
¤
t(st) ¡ ¯t:













It follows that ¹ !(¯) ´ !(¯;¯) = (1 ¡ ±µ)»(¯) and that ªk(¯;b) is ﬁnite as b ! »(¯)
because ± in equation (13) is bounded away from zero.
Recall that when a reform event takes place, ¼¤
t(mt) has a truncated log-normal
distribution, and denote its mean as ¹ ¼¤(mt). Also denote ¹ qk as the unconditional
probability of the event fst = kg, which is an element of the ergodic distribution of Q.
Then since logd(k) » N(log ¹ d(k);¾2
d(k)) we can write the unconditional expectation:
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Proposition 4. As " ! 0 the beliefs f¯tg from (A8) converge weakly to the solution
of the ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE):
_ ¯ = G(¯) (A9)
for ± > 0 and a broad class of probability distributions of ´dt(st) and ´¼ t(st) (including
those speciﬁed in (A1) and (A2).
Proof. Under our assumptions about distributions and the truncation rule, this follows
from Kushner and Yin (1997). ¤
The ODE (A9) governs the mean dynamics G, in that for small gains the belief
trajectories tend to track those of the ODE. Thus, for beliefs to converge in a weak
sense to an SCE, that SCE must be a stable equilibrium point of the ODE (A9). We
don’t have an explicit expression for G, so we shall ﬁnd the SCE numerically. Thus,
we look for a stationary point ¯¤ such that G(¯¤) = 0. Since the system is scalar the
stability condition is simply G0(¯¤) < 0. This gives formal content to the diagram in
Figure 1 and the related discussion.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 39
B.2. Conditional SCEs. For comparison, we are also interested in the self-conﬁrming
equilibria that would result if the economy were forever to remain in one average deﬁcit
regime. Thus, instead of (A7) the orthogonality condition is now:
E [¼t ¡ ¯jmt = m 8t] = 0; (A10)
where again ¼t is itself a function of ¯. We refer to these as conditional self-conﬁrming
equilibria. Since our estimated average deﬁcit regimes are very persistent, we expect
beliefs to adapt to these slowly varying regimes. We justify the consideration of
conditional SCEs by reﬁning our small-gain limit above. We now consider a two time-
scale limit, in which the gain in the belief updating goes to zero but the probabilities
of switching mean deﬁcit regimes go to zero at a faster rate.
For simplicity, consider the case where the mean deﬁcit regime state takes on two
values: mt 2 f0;1g. Then note that we can write the evolution of the mean deﬁcit
state mt as:
mt+1 = mt + ´t+1(mt)
where ´t+1(0) = 0 with probability Qm(1;1), ´t+1(0) = 1 with probability Qm(2;1),
´t+1(1) = 0 with probability Qm(2;2), and ´t+1(1) = ¡1 with probability Qm(1;2).
Thus, we have:
Etmt+1 = mt + Qm(¡m;m)(1 ¡ 2mt)
where Qm(¡m;m) is the oﬀ-diagonal element of column m of Qm. Therefore we can
re-write the evolution as:
mt+1 = mt + Qm(¡m;m)(1 ¡ 2mt) + vt+1
where Etvt+1 = 0. Now we consider a slow variation limit where Qm ! I, and
thus we scale Qm(m;¡m) by a small parameter ®, which also implies the martingale
diﬀerence term vt+1 inherits the scaling. Thus, we extend the system that we analyze
from (A8) to:
¯t+1 = ¯t + "g(¯t;¯t¡1;dt(mt;vt);¼
¤
t) (A11)
mt+1 = mt + ®[Qm(¡m;m)(1 ¡ 2mt) + vt+1]
Now, following Tadić and Meyn (2003) we consider the limit where " ! 0 and
® ! 0 but where ® ¿ ². In this limit, mt varies more slowly than the beliefs ¯t, and
thus for the belief evolution we can eﬀectively treat the mean deﬁcit state as ﬁxed.
Thus, we extend our previous mean dynamics G(¯) above to the conditional mean
dynamics ^ G(¯;m) that we now deﬁne. To do so, let F´d(v)(x) be the cdf of ´dt(v)
at x, denote ¹ qv;k as the unconditional probability of the event fvt = kg, which is anTHE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 40





»(¯) ¡ ¹ d(m) ¡ x
dF´d(v)(x):
Then we have:
^ G(¯;m) = E[~ g(¯;dt(mt;vt;¼
¤
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¹ qv;k ¡ ¯
Then we have the following result.
Claim 1. Let " ! 0 and ® ! 0 such that ®=" ! 0 and "3=2=® ! 0. Then for
m0 = m the beliefs f¯tg from (A11) converge weakly to the solution of the ordinary
diﬀerential equation (ODE):
_ ¯ = ^ G(¯;m) (A12)
for ± > 0 and a broad class of probability distributions of ´dt(st) and ´¼ t(st) (including
those speciﬁed in (A1) and (A2).
Proof. (Sketch.) This follows from Corollary 2 to Theorem 2 in Tadić and Meyn
(2003). Since they focus on convergence of the “slow” process mt as well they require
stronger stability conditions on the ODE then are necessary for our result. ¤
The conditional self-conﬁrming equilibria are the collections of ﬁxed points of the
conditional dynamics, and thus are the ¯¤ that satisfy ^ G(¯¤;m) = 0. Again, for a
conditional SCE to be a limit point of the learning it must be stable and thus satisfy
^ G¯(¯¤;m) < 0. In section (VIII), we study how well the conditional SCE beliefs
approximate rational expectations beliefs under our estimated parameters.
B.3. Qualiﬁcations. It is important to note that we have convergence in a weak
sense of convergence in distribution. For any constant positive gain, when regimes
change and as the deﬁcit is hit by shocks, beliefs will continue to ﬂuctuate. These
ﬂuctuations become proportionately smaller when the gain " is smaller, but for any
positive gain the beliefs will have a non-degenerate distribution. As the gain shrinks,
this distribution collapses to a point mass on the solution of the ODE. Proposition 4
describes only the average behavior of beliefs for small gains. There may be extendedTHE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 41
periods in which beliefs are away from the SCE, particularly when some regimes may
be experienced for extended periods. This is why the conditional SCEs in Claim 1
are useful reference points for the analysis. Over the relatively long spells in which
the average deﬁcit state is constant the beliefs would tend to be centered on the
conditional SCE. However, the escape dynamics play an important role as well, and
they persist with positive gains.
Appendix C. Rational Expectations Equilibria
We now suspend the adaptive learning rule (6) and consider a subset of the rational
expectations equilibria of the model. Further, while previously we’ve assumed that
agents within the model do not observe the Markov state governing seignorage, we
now assume that rational agents do condition on the average deﬁcit state mt.
C.1. Computing equilibria. We seek stationary Markov equilibria in which inﬂa-
tion and expected inﬂation are given by:
¼t = ¼(st;mt¡1;dt)







¼([j;k];mt; ¹ d(j) + x)dF´d(k)(x)¹ qv;kQm(mt;j)
´ ¼
e(mt);
where we use the notation st = [j;k] ´ [mt = j;vt = k]. Note that we assume that
the state vt governing seignorage shocks is unobserved and that agents’ subjective
distribution over this state is given by the ergodic distribution ¹ qv. Then going through
calculations similar to those above we have:
¼(st;mt¡1;dt) =
µ(1 ¡ ¸¼e(mt¡1))
1 ¡ ¸¼e(mt) ¡ dt(st)
:
Again this only holds when the denominator is positive (which is the more stringent
condition), so we truncate as above, giving:




1 ¡ ¸¼e(mt) ¡ dt(st)
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Letting !ij = !(¼e(j);¼e(i)) and taking expectations of both sides conditional on





















where »i = 1 ¡ ¼e(i)¸ and ªk is as above. Thus, we have hm coupled equations
determining ¼e(mt). Substituting this solution into the expression for ¼(¢) then gives
the evolution of inﬂation under rational expectations. The equations are suﬃciently
complicated that an analytic solution is not available, and hence we must look for
equilibria numerically. A simple iterative solution method for the equations consists
of initializing the ¼e(j) on the right side of (A13) and computing ¼e(i) on the left
side and iterating until convergence. Alternatively, any other numerical nonlinear
equation solver can be used.
C.2. Multiplicity and nonexistence. Though there are multiple rational expec-
tations equilibria of the model, there is typically a unique SCE that is stable under
learning. As we’ve seen, in the deterministic counterpart of the model there are two
REEs. With small enough shocks, we also ﬁnd that there are two conditional SCEs
in each regime. As discussed above, the SCEs average across these conditional SCEs.
Thus, for example with two possible regimes and two conditional SCEs in each regime,
there would typically be two SCEs, with one of them stable. REEs also average across
the conditional SCEs, taking into account the probability of regime switches. So, for
example, with two conditional SCEs in each regime, there are typically four REEs
that switch between values close to the conditional SCEs in each regime. However,
when shocks to seignorage become large enough there may be only one conditional
SCE in a regime, or it could even occur that a conditional SCE fails to exist alto-
gether. Depending on the weight that these high-shock regimes have in the invariant
distribution, the SCE may also fail to exist. Similarly, there may be fewer rational
expectations equilibria or none at all.
As we’ve seen, these observations are empirically relevant, as in some countries our
estimates imply very large seignorage shocks in some regimes. Nevertheless, in all
cases we ﬁnd that a stable SCE exists, even though there may not be a conditional
SCE in the high shock regimes. This suggests that beliefs may tend to diverge in
the regimes with high shocks, with agents expecting ever-growing inﬂation (up to
the truncation point). But the regimes usually will not last long enough for this to
actually happen, and the lower shock regimes tend to bring beliefs back down.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 43
Appendix D. Seigniorage Rates: Actual Data and Model Implications
Because we have no reliable data on real output and money on a monthly basis,
we construct a time series of annual deﬁcits ﬁnanced by money creation. Following













where the subscript “A” stands for annual and the superscript “Agg” stands for ag-
gregate. M
Agg
A;t is aggregate reserve money for the year containing the month indexed
by t and Y
Agg
A;t is aggregate nominal GDP in that year. For this calculation, there is
no parameter µ involved because we work directly on the aggregate data on money.
To make the simulated data from our model as close to (A14) as possible, we
compute the distribution of dA;t as follows. We ﬁrst draw st from Pr(stj^ Á;¼T) and for
a given st we then draw dt(st) and compute dA;t as an average of dt(st) over the twelve
months for the year containing all these months indexed by t. The simulated data dA;t
is only an approximation to the actual data dData
A;t because of these diﬀerences. The
price index data Pt used for our model is CPI, not the GDP deﬂator. For the actual
data, dData
A;t is calculated as a ratio of two sums or aggregates. For the simulated data,
dData
A;t is computed as a sum of monthly money creations in percent of real output.
In our estimation, dt is arbitrarily normalized. When comparing to actual data, we
need to re-normalize it. We do so by matching the average of medians of simulated
annual deﬁcits to the average of actual annual deﬁcits over the sample for Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. For Chile, we use the average over the sample excluding
the hyperinﬂation period 1971-1975 during which large simulated deﬁcits are caused
by a large variance of deﬁcit shocks. The eﬀect of this relatively large variance is
shown by the skewed distribution marked by the dashed bands in the second-row
graph of Figure 6. Note that changes in shock variances has no eﬀect on the median
of simulated deﬁcits.
Appendix E. Additional Tables and Figures
Tables 6-10 present the full maximum likelihood estimates of our model for the ﬁve
countries in our sample.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 44
Table 6. Argentina: MLEs for the 2 £ 3 regime-switching model
¸ : 0:730(0:0104)
[¹ d(1); ¹ d(2)] : [0:0937(0:0009); 0:0228(0:0002)]
[»d(1); »d(2); »d(3)] : [0:104(0:050); 1:482(0:074); 3:784(0:226)]
»¼ : 16:78(5:178)
² : 0:023(0:001)
Transition probability matrix Qm for ¹ d(st):
0.9789 (0.014) 0.0162
0.0211 0.9838 (0.007)
Transition probability matrix Qv for ´dt(st):
0.4395 (0.139) 0.0370 0.0000
0.5605 0.9260 (0.021) 0.0287
0.0000 0.0370 0.9713 (0.018)
Note: the numbers in the parentheses are estimated standard errors.
Table 7. Bolivia: MLEs for the 2 £ 3 regime-switching model
¸ : 0:307(0:038)
[¹ d(1); ¹ d(2)] : [0:1088(0:0078); 0:0151(0:0006)]
[»d(1); »d(2); »d(3)] : [0:053(0:0396); 1:322(0:0732); 3:252(0:3157)]
»¼ : 26:52(2:5114)
² : 0:232(0:0375)
Transition probability matrix Qm for ¹ d(st):
0.9629 (0.0237) 0.0041
0.0371 0.9959 (0.0028)
Transition probability matrix Qv for ´dt(st):
0.3344 (0.1067) 0.0910 0.0000
0.6656 0.8180 (0.0426) 0.1487
0.0000 0.0910 0.8513 (0.0405)
Note: the numbers in the parentheses are estimated standard errors.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 45
Table 8. Brazil: MLEs for the 3 £ 2 regime-switching model
¸ : 0:613(0:0073)
[¹ d(1) ¹ d(2) ¹ d(3)] : [0:0771(0:0020); 0:0375(0:0006); 0:0096(0:0001)]
[»d(1) »d(2)] : [2:818(0:1672); 10:929(1:0010)]
»¼ : 9:18(10:8305)
² : 0:189(0:0118)
Transition probability matrix Qm for ¹ d(st):
0.9845 (0.0127) 0.0134 0.0000
0.0155 0.9732 (0.0224) 0.0000
0.0000 0.0134 1.0000
Transition probability matrix Qv for ´dt(st):
0.9344 (0.0292) 0.0969
0.0656 0.9031 (0.0338)
Note: the numbers in the parentheses are estimated standard errors.
Table 9. Chile: MLEs for the 2 £ 3 regime-switching model
¸ : 0:875(0:0000)
[¹ d(1) ¹ d(2)] : [0:0200(0:0000); 0:0110(0:0000)]
[»d(1) »d(2) »d(3)] : [0:203(0:0619); 2:298(0:1036); 6:985(0:5367)]
»¼ : 10:62(3:8807)
² : 0:025(0:0000)
Transition probability matrix Qm for ¹ d(st):
0.9869 (0.0051) 0.0070
0.0131 0.9930 (0.0076)
Transition probability matrix Qv for ´dt(st):
0.7627 (0.0740) 0.0345 0.0000
0.2373 0.9310 (0.0193) 0.0869
0.0000 0.0345 0.9131 (0.0289)
Note: the numbers in the parentheses are estimated standard errors.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 46
Table 10. Peru: MLEs for the 3 £ 2 regime-switching model
¸ : 0:740(0:0001)
[¹ d(1) ¹ d(2) ¹ d(3)] : [0:0542(0:0003); 0:0219(0:0001); 0:0139(0:0001)]
[»d(1) »d(2)] : [0:394(0:0714); 3:208(0:1107)]
»¼ : 15:97(2:4004)
² : 0:069(0:0025)
Transition probability matrix Qm for ¹ d(st):
0.9943 (0.0076) 0.0187 0.0000
0.0057 0.9626 (0.0142) 0.0350
0.0000 0.0187 0.9650 (0.0166)
Transition probability matrix Qv for ´dt(st):
0.3016 (0.1310) 0.0453
0.6984 0.9547 (0.0127)
Note: the numbers in the parentheses are estimated standard errors.
Figures 10-14 plot the smoothed (two-sided) probabilities of the regimes condi-
tional on our estimates and the full data sample. Each panel of the ﬁgures plots the
probability of a particular combination (m;v) of the mean deﬁcit and deﬁcit shock
variance states.
Figures 15 - 19 summarize the relative ﬁt of our model for each country. In each
ﬁgure, the top panel plots the inﬂation data along with the 90% probability bands
for the one-step ahead forecasts from out model. The second panel plots the time
series of the log of the conditional likelihood for our model, while the third panel
plot the corresponding time series for the best-ﬁtting regime-switching autoregressive
statistical model. The bottom panel plot the diﬀerence between the two previous log
conditional likelihoods. Together these bottom three panels summarize the relative
ﬁt of our model versus the statistical model in diﬀerent time periods.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 47








Regime with high average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with high average seigniorage and medium shock








Regime with high average seigniorage and small shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and medium shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and small shock
Figure 10. Argentina: smoothed probability of the regimes condi-
tional on the MLEs and the data.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 48








Regime with high average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with high average seigniorage and medium shock








Regime with high average seigniorage and small shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and medium shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and small shock
Figure 11. Bolivia: smoothed probabilities of the regimes conditional
on the MLEs and the data.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 49








Regime with high average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with high average seigniorage and small shock








Regime with medium average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with medium average seigniorage and small shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and small shock
Figure 12. Brazil: smoothed probabilities of the regimes conditional
on the MLEs and the data.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 50








Regime with high average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with high average seigniorage and medium shock








Regime with high average seigniorage and small shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and medium shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and small shock
Figure 13. Chile: smoothed probabilities of the regimes conditional
on the MLEs and the data.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 51








Regime with high average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with high average seigniorage and small shock








Regime with medium average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with medium average seigniorage and small shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and large shock








Regime with low average seigniorage and small shock
Figure 14. Peru: smoothed probabilities of the regimes conditional
on the MLEs and the data.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 52



























































Figure 15. Argentina: 90% probability bands of one-step predictions
from our theoretical model, the log value of the conditional likelihood
p(¼tj¦t¡1; ^ Á for both the theoretical and statistical models, and the
diﬀerence in log conditional likelihood.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 53































































Figure 16. Bolivia: 90% probability bands of one-step predictions
from our theoretical model, the log value of the conditional likelihood
p(¼tj¦t¡1; ^ Á for both the theoretical and statistical models, and the
diﬀerence in log conditional likelihood.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 54






























































Figure 17. Brazil: 90% probability bands of one-step predictions
from our theoretical model, the log value of the conditional likelihood
p(¼tj¦t¡1; ^ Á for both the theoretical and statistical models, and the
diﬀerence in log conditional likelihood.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 55































































Figure 18. Chile: 90% probability bands of one-step predictions
from our theoretical model, the log value of the conditional likelihood
p(¼tj¦t¡1; ^ Á for both the theoretical and statistical models, and the
diﬀerence in log conditional likelihood.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 56































































Figure 19. Peru: 90% probability bands of one-step predictions
from our theoretical model, the log value of the conditional likelihood
p(¼tj¦t¡1; ^ Á for both the theoretical and statistical models, and the
diﬀerence in log conditional likelihood.THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH AMERICAN INFLATION 57
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